11 Mobilizing the World: Brian Mulroney and Canada’s Humanitarian Response to Famine in Sub-Saharan Africa
Jonathon Zimmer
Introduction:
When Progressive Conservative leader, Brian Mulroney ran for federal election in 1984, he campaigned on four broad themes in an attempt to defeat the governing Liberals that had held power almost continuously since 1963: prudent fiscal management, an engaged and responsive foreign policy, a revamped social policy, and improved federal-provincial relations.[1] While humanitarian issues in Canadian foreign policy were absent from the campaign, especially those related to a relatively unknown famine developing in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Progressive Conservatives were well situated to address disasters from their own policy standpoint. However, once the election concluded with a Progressive Conservative victory, and the new government was sworn in, media outlets across the nation presented shocking images of human suffering in that region of Africa, which moved Canadians towards action. Mulroney and his Cabinet found themselves beset by an eager public demanding the Canadian government to assist those affected by the famine in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in Ethiopia. An all-party response quickly coalesced as Canada’s public and private resources began an arduous process of mobilization to deliver aid to the people of famine-stricken Ethiopia. This paper demonstrates how Mulroney managed Canada’s response, both within his government and those interacting with the international community through the United Nations. His deployment of key individuals to critical areas in the relief effort and in international relations played a pivotal role in marshalling the Canadian people in an effort never seen before.
We should not minimize Mulroney’s personal commitment, however, as he was moved by the images just like the rest of the nation: he was appalled and shocked by human suffering on such a large scale. Even if he wished to act expeditiously, Canada’s response to the crisis was hampered by a sluggish international response, wariness among its allies towards Africa, and bitter Cold War politics that forced Canada to build an international coalition with the aim of addressing the crisis in the beleaguered African nation. If it were not for Mulroney’s own determination to act on the famine, aid to Ethiopia would have been severely undermined, and the new Progressive Conservative government’s image at home and abroad would have been tarnished.
Various factors led to the famine in Sub-Saharan Africa, namely political instability, drought, and overpopulation. These emerging trends, combined with previous famines that dotted the twentieth century, quickly overwhelmed the impoverished nation of Ethiopia. Emperor Hallie Selassie had ruled Ethiopia until the early 1970s, when a communist revolution, spearheaded by a military junta, seized power. Famine had been one of the reasons Selassie had been overthrown. The new communist government was widely regarded in the West as having rectified many of the issues that plagued the previous monarchy, so much so that by 1980, famine was widely regarded as no longer being a threat to the country.[2] However, within the first few years of the 1980s, signs emerged of an impending disaster. Civil conflict ensued, particularly in northern Ethiopia, which led to both Cuba and the Soviet Union deploying troops to help their African ally.[3]
The first reports of a renewed famine came from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which had acted on unconfirmed rumours of a crisis in the Horn of Africa. What they saw shocked reporters. The Ethiopian government was hesitant to allow reporters into areas affected by famine, specifically into the northern areas, such as Eritrea and Tigray, that were in active rebellion.[4] As footage reached viewers in the United Kingdom, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) dispatched its own team to Ethiopia, headed by Brian Stewart, a CBC reporter. Quickly, the Canadian team, too, realized the scope of the humanitarian disaster and took innovative measures to smuggle the footage back to Canada.[5] Just as the footage made its way onto the CBC’s news programs, the recently elected 33rd Parliament under Brian Mulroney was in its first days of its administration. It was ill-prepared for the outpouring of support and demands for action from the public once the CBC broadcasted Stewart’s reports.
In his own writings, Mulroney demonstrated a personal commitment to humanitarianism. However, his legacy on foreign policy is situated more with his policies against Apartheid, acid rain, and certainly the promotion of free trade with the United States. On the Ethiopian famine, Mulroney’s legacy is rooted more on the role he played in managing the crisis in his Cabinet and delegating to others rather than taking control of the crisis himself. Even Brian Stewart lamented the fact that many facets of Canada’s response to the famine and Mulroney’s part in it have often been muted.[6] When he came to power in 1984, Mulroney expressed a desire to circumvent Canadian bureaucracy by making appointments based on recommendations of those for roles that he believed would make an impact.[7] Once the story of Ethiopia broke, he was receptive to disaster relief, but it was only when he was shown images of human suffering that he finally got involved. The visual representation of Brian Stewart walking amongst suffering Ethiopians made a difference. Aired on 1 November 1984, on CBC’s premier news program, The National, Stewart proved that the situation developing in Ethiopia could no longer be ignored. Mulroney now had the opportunity, as this was his first foreign affairs crisis, to chart a new course for Canadian foreign policy, distinct from that of the previous Liberal administrations.[8] In his memoirs, Mulroney noted his own surprise at the images of famine and death, with children, “dying in the ravaged country and nothing was happening to stop it.”[9]
The images that aired on CBC and the country’s reaction to them provided a challenge for both politicians and the media to comprehend why they resonated with Canadians when previous famines had failed to capture widespread interest. In the previous famine of the 1970s in Ethiopia, television aired similar videos of human suffering, but these images quickly slipped out of public interest. However, in 1984, media and government interest in the famine converged and created real desire to act.[10]
The Progressive Conservatives had originally opposed providing aid to Ethiopia, claiming Canada should not be aiding, through humanitarian efforts or otherwise, a Marxist nation. In fact, Brian Stewart echoed reports of concerned European Union (EU) parliamentarians who believed foreign aid to Ethiopia was simply being forwarded to the Soviet Union.[11] During the Liberal government’s time in office, the Minister of Agriculture, Eugene Whelan, had recommended to Pierre Trudeau that Canada send a $20 million aid package. Trudeau refused, believing the situation was simply not dire enough to warrant such a response.[12] Because of this, foreign aid became a highly politicized topic in Canada, as various Canadian governments had sought to establish their own policy in the area. Yet, the images by Brian Stewart washed away political concerns over Ethiopia’s Marxist government, along with suspected inabilities in the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the federal Canadian organization that administered foreign aid programs in developing countries, to help in such situations.[13]
As prime minister, Mulroney had demonstrated that his stance on a number of policy issues was notoriously fluid, and he would compromise in making a political decision. However, on humanitarian issues, he was unequivocal. He openly disagreed with the notion that the United Nations (UN) was not able to act on the African famine. Under his instruction, the Canadian delegation at the UN pressed for an international response.[14] Brian Stewart, who was later surprised how few Canadians recall the effort on the part of Brian Mulroney and his government in demonstrating leadership, noted that Mulroney developed a legacy as having been the politician who was “totally committed and in-charge.”[15] Many questions and later testimony point to Mulroney’s commitment in the initial days after the coverage by the CBC, which set the direction of Canada’s aid policy during the crisis. To assist the government in establishing an appropriate response, Mulroney relied on bipartisan support. Largely in part due to the humanitarian nature of the disaster, and because no party in Parliament or the provinces had advocated for aid to Ethiopia before the CBC report, no party could be held accountable for the situation.
Mulroney’s appointment of former Ontario NDP leader Stephen Lewis as Canada’s representative at the UN is one such example of bipartisan support. This unusual selection represented an instance of Mulroney focusing more on personal recommendations from his advisers rather than party affiliation of the candidate. Mulroney also wanted a strong voice at the UN, one that would stress his own personal views on Apartheid and fulfill his own interests in Africa.[16] As the new ambassador, Lewis quickly repented of his prior transgressions during his tenure as NDP leader, specifically when he had claimed that Mulroney had been “grovelling reverentially to the White House.” Mulroney himself noted that Lewis had now learned “the art of self-discipline.”[17] Mulroney demonstrated his own desire to capitalize on the famine and reassure the public of his commitment to the situation and mobilized the international community. In a conversation with Mulroney, after watching Brian Stewart’s report on 1 November 1984, Lewis commented: “I hope, Prime Minister, that you’re thinking of doing what I think you’re thinking of doing.”[18] Mulroney quickly responded: “I am.”[19] Lewis, according to Brian Stewart, “galvanized the General Assembly into taking action on African famine, which demanded nothing less than “a Herculean effort on the part of all member nations.””[20]
Not all political leaders agreed with Lewis and Mulroney. The “herculean” task of mobilizing aid for Ethiopia was met with a cool reception from both the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the United States President Ronald Reagan. Thatcher was well regarded as a leader whose government “was generally one of strong policy positions and this was no exception.”[21] While public pressure would take more time in the UK to force a change in her anti-communist position, Mulroney tasked Stephen Lewis to bring forward a motion in the General Assembly calling for aid. A combination of public interest and coverage from media outlets across the Western world helped. The United Nations created a special office in Addis Ababa to make coordination easier between various organizations and the Ethiopian government through the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission.[22] However, while the Canadian government had also channeled aid through the same commission, the Canadian media became skeptical as they reported that the Commission was responsible for maintaining Ethiopia’s 300,000 strong standing army.[23] This, along with the tumultuous political situation in Ethiopia, fueled fears that much of the aid for famine relief was not actually reaching victims, who were “located behind rebel lines in Tigray and Eritrea.”[24] Regardless of the situation, the Canadian delegation, headed by Stephen Lewis, demonstrated its commitment in pushing the international community into action. Mulroney’s original objective in selecting someone who would be a capable force in the UN had paid off.
While Steven Lewis became a powerful force at the UN, Mulroney also had the capable former prime minister and current Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark in his political arsenal. Clark was instrumental in recognising the emerging role between the media and government, as well as the potential for creating a relationship between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and government agencies and policies. Alongside the efforts of David MacDonald, who was tasked with coordinating Canada’s relief efforts, Joe Clark measured the inclusion of NGOs in crafting foreign policy as one of his hallmark achievements, based on their own interests and involvement in various crises.[25] When reflecting on his time as foreign minister, Clark recalled that NGOs had been his most ardent critics: they had been suspicious of anything that he, representing the government, had put forward. For this reason, he had transitioned the focus away from the innate disagreements found between NGO and government agencies and, instead, redirected them towards their common agreements.[26] What he had forecasted, stemming from his and other foreign minister’s experience in Ethiopia and beyond, was a crucial element of interdependence between various organizations. The late twentieth century saw an explosion in the number of operable NGOs that were able to work relatively efficiently with government.[27] It was this mixture of commonalities and public interest that created an efficient system that enabled two-thirds of Canadians to donate towards Ethiopia, and, as Clark, quoting Brian Stewart, notes, “was probably responsible for saving an excess of 700,000 lives.”[28]
In the House of Commons, Joe Clark received questions and various commendations from the Opposition, both for Canada’s demonstration of leadership in the crisis and concerns as to where Canada’s activities could be improved. Several archived debates from the House identify MPs, such as John Oostrom, who echoed the sentiments of his constituents in the “exemplary” action taken by Clark in delivering aid to Ethiopia.[29] However, various members also sought to address many underlying issues. In early November, Jean Chrétien directed his attention to Conservative efforts abroad, beginning first by congratulating Clark for visiting Ethiopia to see the situation for himself.[30] Chrétien’s intrigue pointed to the idea of establishing a more efficient system of relief by way of a mobile unit that would utilize De Havilland type aircraft to make food delivery much more efficient.[31] While Chrétien also expressed pleasure that Canada was leading in the famine relief, Clark foreshowed in his response that such a rapid-relief force could be included in a final recommendation made by the emergency response coordinator. Clark also hoped that the Ethiopian government would do whatever was necessary to ensure that food reached all affected parties, thus also addressing another of Chrétien’s concerns.[32] In a caucus meeting, Joe Clark further reiterated his commitment to Ethiopia by stating that the crisis warranted treatment as an all-party committee.[33] This point was further corroborated later in December 1984, when NDP MP Lynn McDonald stated before the House of the “solid unanimity” across Parliament as to both the impression they as MP’s had about the crisis and what actions Canada should be taking.[34] Her reaction was in response to a delegation of representatives from the three major parties who personally surveyed the situation in Ethiopia. She also stressed the varied nature of Canada’s response, noting that Ethiopia, together with other Sub-Saharan African nations, would require continued assistance to become “self-sufficient in agriculture [while] massive intervention is needed for reforestation, agricultural improvement, and water projects.”[35] The cooperation in the House demonstrated that the Conservative government could rely on bipartisan support in their approach to Ethiopia. Moreover, many of the criticisms of the government would eventually be addressed in new policy initiatives.
Members of the House of Commons were quick to chastise the government for not delivering information immediately to their colleagues. Ms. Pauline Jewett, NDP MP for New Westminster-Coquitlam, took aim at Joe Clark for what she claimed was giving management of the crisis to MacDonald. She claimed, regarding aid and MacDonald’s position, that he “is co-ordinating it, not instigating it,” and wanted to know the precise measures that the government itself was taking in conjunction with public commitments.[36] For his part, Clark recommended patience while the government gathered information and prepared its own course of action. Such actions were later applauded by Chrétien, specifically where the government itself had steadily increased contributions to Ethiopia over the course of November. Chrétien also commended Clark for his nonpartisan handling of the crisis, with such high praise as Clark’s statement for 17 November 1984 reflecting “the thoughts of the Canadian people.”[37] As with most instances of debate in the House, Chrétien criticized the government for reducing foreign aid commitments while simultaneously allocating new funding toward the crisis. “No one wants to be partisan about this issue,” Chrétien declared before the House, “While I believe the Minister is taking the right steps, I hope he can assure us that it is not just a façade to hide cuts in other areas.”[38] In other instances in the House, Clark also indicated some of the funding was coming from a special fund established for famine relief, while his Conservative government was taking steps to cancelling cutbacks that had been ordered under the previous Liberal administration.[39]
General enthusiasm from the public was crucial to Canada’s response. Other MP’s, like Jim Edwards, recounted how the Kiwanis Club of Edmonton was motioning a donation of $10,000 from its boards for the purpose of famine relief.[40] Liberal MP Alfonso Gagliano declared that he had received a check for $547 from the students of Pierre de Coubertin School in Saint-Leonard that read, “we felt that it was our duty as Canadians, Christians, and as human beings to save someone’s life.”[41]
The House of Common’s Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, while commending Clark’s actions, also raised concerns over the conduct of CIDA toward Ethiopia in the years leading up to the famine.[42] Steven Langdon, NDP MP for Essex-Windsor, explained to the Committee on 29 November about the categorizing system employed by CIDA, and that it has miscategorised Ethiopia which then reduced aid to the country.[43] Other MP’s on the Committee questioned how CIDA evaluated itse activities of as governments change. Langdon chastised Margaret Catley-Carleson, president of CIDA during the famine and vice-president during the Liberal administration in the late 1970s, for initially ignoring his specific questions. Her response on CIDA’s categorizing system employed during her tenure as vice president was that it was essentially a new methodology, and it was a blend of various “characteristics which is reviewed at the ministerial level to make decisions on eligibility.”[44] External Relations Minister Monique Vezina interjected in defence of Catley-Carleson during Langdon’s gruelling interrogation and stated that Joe Clark’s objectives were tied to consultations on rewriting Canada’s foreign policy, not dwelling on what happened prior. In further regards to CIDA, Langdon accused the department of making political considerations its paramount concern in categorizing the level of developmental assistance a nation was set to receive. Vezina responded aptly: “We are a new government, which has promised to elevate the various programs, to keep what is worthwhile, and to correct any deficiencies.”[45] Several other questions put forward during the hearing, such as why Canada was not putting forward short-term famine relief solutions prior to November 1, were simply dismissed as they were decided by the previous government and Vezina claimed she could only speculate on their motives.
A third key component in Mulroney’s famine response was the appointment of David MacDonald, a former Conservative MP and a politician who had a “sterling reputation in Ottawa as a man of conscience,” who had been tasked with directing Canada’s response to the crisis.[46] His unique and personalized style of leadership, combined with a keen understanding of the novelty of the situation, proved that he was effective in maintaining momentum, and was careful in framing the famine in terms that tended to portray Ethiopians as victims of circumstance. Still, MacDonald was surprised at the overwhelming support that came from across Canada, saying that “it just came up from the ground.”[47] He, too, received considerable praise for activities undertaken by his office, and by issuing reports that were well-received by Canadians.[48] Further evidence of his capabilities came from Canadians who were facing hardship but were still more than willing to donate to the aid effort. Nancy Leavitt, a mother of three and a student, offered $125 under the belief that the money she gave would go to food, not arms, and that her family could “all have a clear conscious” at Christmas.[49] These offerings, made by members of the public, were also then redressed by various MPs in the House.
While many MPs from both parties regarded the selection of David MacDonald as the best choice to manage and coordinate both the private and public resources for famine relief, it was not without controversy. MacDonald was held responsible by the media on a variety of topics that pertained to both the actions of government and concerns over whether aid was going specifically to famine victims. In one such claim, made in January 1985, of aid being withheld from conflict zones in Eritrea and Tigray, Liberal MP Brian Tobin called for an independent investigation into the accusations of the media. Monique Vezina promptly dismissed the request and stated in the House: “We knew very well that helping Ethiopia was helping a country where a civil war was underway.”[50] Likewise, MP Ken James also pointed out that a sizeable donation of $82,000 from a constituent of his was earmarked for Mother Theresa operating in Addis Ababa, yet the money was waiting at the Canadian embassy to be dispersed.[51] Such concerns were easier for the government to respond to as they could (and did) claim that it would be distributed as soon as possible.
MacDonald was able to effectively deliver reports to Clark and the Canadian public as to how the Canadian government was dealing with various aspects of the crisis. Transparency and reporting were two important factors throughout the various phases of the crisis. The core tenet behind federal allocation and the matching of public donations by the government was presented as a way to prevent another famine. This took a variety of initiatives, such as food-for-work programs, education, and, as would eventually become controversial, relocation.[52] Most importantly, MacDonald and his staff were able to frame the crisis as Canada helping Africans to help themselves.[53] Featured in his report for March, 1985, MacDonald also delivered a list of recommendations for Canada to undertake in the future to avoid similar crises, with one of them being cooperating with NGOs and maintaining a permanent office designed to watch for famine.[54]
The Mulroney government’s focus on the famine won it praise as it entered 1985. For example, a public opinion survey from the government’s chief pollster, Allan Gregg, demonstrated that the majority of those surveyed were more concerned with famine relief than economic issues that had been a key element in the 1984 federal campaign.[55] MacDonald was keenly aware of the variety of ways that he could take advantage of the public’s interest in the crisis, and sometimes interested groups came to him. Bruce Allen, manager for the homegrown music group Northern Lights, approached MacDonald asking for financial assistance for a recording session for what would become one of the most memorable creations of the crisis in Canada, the single Tears Are Not Enough.[56] Aside from generating an incredible number of donations for famine relief, which was then matched by CIDA, people involved with the single remained in contact with the federal relief efforts and some even went to Africa to see the situation for themselves.[57] Mila Mulroney, long after the single’s debut, was so interested in the song that she would record a documentary in late 1985 of how the single was made.[58]
As the media moved on to other issues, topics of misconduct in managing the crisis steadily emerged. Clark’s initial reassurances in the House in 1984 proved to only delay the inevitable. The confusing situation in Ethiopia, having been ongoing for much of the 1980s, was eliciting wariness from many Parliamentarians. Bill Blaikie, the NDP’s foreign policy critic, took the Conservatives to task and claimed, “There is a place where Canada will draw the line.”[59] The complex situation in Ethiopia, coupled with a progressively worsening case of donor fatigue, reflected the reality of the scale of the crisis, whereas the political situation was still “off putting.”[60] As David MacDonald was ordered by Mulroney to wind down his office in 1986, renewed calls for aid had emerged from international organizations like the World Food Program, which claimed that “Ethiopia, Mozambique, Malawi, Angola, Somalia, and the Sudan needed 2.3 million tons of food.”[61] Still, Canada considered its work done in Ethiopia.
Conclusion:
It was Mulroney’s sense of Canada’s commitment to the African famine, and humanitarian issues more generally, that propelled Canadian activities at home and abroad. While the United Kingdom and the United States floundered on the issue of supplying aid to a communist nation, Mulroney sought to create a new role for Canada by demonstrating not only an independent foreign policy but also one based on the values and morals that he claimed represented Canada. That attitude also prompted the public’s interest in the crisis. Ultimately, Mulroney was subject to the same pressure that defined his immediate response to the famine. After nearly two years of action, Mulroney ordered David MacDonald to conclude his work and deliver his final recommendations as the public prepared to move onto the next major issue. Earlier, he had ordered Steven Lewis, already in place as Canada’s UN ambassador, to mobilize international aid to the crisis. Joe Clark, having already commanded a short-lived administration, effectively controlled issues in the House of Commons and provided answers to his colleagues on the opposite bench. His role in facilitating dialogue between NGOs and the government completed the government’s objective to establish a foreign policy that became distinct and would be used by future administrations to deal with future crises. Just as during the 1984 campaign, Mulroney keenly understood public interest. His understanding of personal relationships over party politics enabled him to become an effective leader at home and abroad during the Ethiopian crisis and with a judicious selection of Cabinet colleagues and other Canadians, he effectively mobilized Canada and the world to address a pressing social issue in Africa.
- Christopher Waddell, “Policy and Partisanship on the Campaign Trail: Mulroney Works His Wonder, Twice.” In Transforming the Nation: Canada and Brian Mulroney. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007. 20. ↵
- Robin Wright, “Butter, bullets, and books.” Maclean's, Sep 29, 1980. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Suzanne Franks, Reporting Disasters: Famine, Aid, Politics and the Media. London: Hurst & Company, 2013. 16. ↵
- Tony Burman, “Ebola: Canada Forgets Its Leadership in Ethiopian Famine.” thestar.com. Toronto Star, November 1, 2014. ↵
- Brian Stewart, “When Brian Mulroney was Great.” www.cbc.ca. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. May 15, 2009. ↵
- Brian Mulroney, Memoirs: 1939-1993. Toronto: M&S, 2007. 330. ↵
- Brian Stewart, “Alerting the World to Famine in Ethiopia.” Video. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. November 1, 1984. ↵
- Mulroney, Memoirs, 331. ↵
- Michael Valpy, "Mass Starvation in a TV World: Africa." The Globe and Mail (1936-), Nov 07, 1984. ↵
- Nassisse Solomon, “Tears are Not Enough: Canadian Political and Social Mobilization For Famine Relief in Ethiopia, 1984-88”, in The Samaritan State Revisited, University of Calgary Press. 2019. 255. ↵
- Kim Richard Nossal and Nelson Michaud, “Out of the Blue: The Mulroney Legacy in Foreign Policy.” In Transforming the Nation: Canada and Brian Mulroney. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007. 118. ↵
- Solomon, “Tears are Not Enough,” 256. ↵
- Mulroney, Memoirs, 331. ↵
- Stewart, “When Brian Mulroney was Great.” ↵
- Mulroney, Memoirs, 330. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Ibid., 331. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Stewart, “When Brian Mulroney was Great.” ↵
- [21] Franks, Reporting Disasters, 5. ↵
- Franks, Reporting Disasters, 114. ↵
- Shona McKay, “The terrible face of famine.” Maclean's, Nov 19, 1984. ↵
- Franks, Reporting Disasters, 115. ↵
- Joe Clark, How We Lead: Canada in a Century of Change. Toronto: Random House Canada, 2013. 64. ↵
- Clark, How We Lead, 64. ↵
- Ibid., 67. ↵
- Ibid., 65. ↵
- Canada, House of Commons Debates. 33rd Parliament, 1st Session: Vol. 1. Library of Parliament / Bibliothèque du Parlement. Image 735. ↵
- Canada, House of Commons Debates, image 24. ↵
- Canada, House of Commons Debates, image 24. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Solomon, “Tears are Not Enough,” 247. ↵
- Canada, House of Commons Debates, image 1341. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Canada, House of Commons Debates, image 29 - 30 ↵
- Ibid., image 308. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Ibid., image 309. ↵
- Solomon, “Tears are Not Enough,” 249. ↵
- Canada, House of Commons Debates, image 1054. ↵
- Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. House of Commons Committees, 33rd Parliament, 1st Session: Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, vol. 1 no. 1-29. Library of Parliament / Bibliothèque du Parlement. Image 35. ↵
- House of Commons Committees, 33rd Parliament, 1st Session: Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, vol. 1 no. 1-29. Image 35. ↵
- House of Commons Committees, 33rd Parliament, 1st Session: Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, vol. 1 no. 1-29. Image 40. ↵
- House of Commons Committees, 33rd Parliament, 1st Session: Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, vol. 1 no. 1-29. Image 41. ↵
- Solomon, “Tears are Not Enough,” 250. ↵
- Stewart, “When Brian Mulroney was Great.” ↵
- Solomon, “Tears are Not Enough,” 253. ↵
- Ibid., 254. ↵
- Fen Osler Hampson, Master of Persuasion: Brian Mulroney’s Global Legacy. New York: Signal, 2018. 52. ↵
- Canada, House of Commons Debates, image 1059 ↵
- Hampson, Master of Persuasion, 53. ↵
- David MacDonald, The African Famine and Canada’s Response. CIDA, Public Affairs Branch. Quebec: Hull, March 1985. 19. ↵
- MacDonald, The African Famine and Canada’s Response, 34. ↵
- Solomon, “Tears are Not Enough,” 249. ↵
- Janyce McGregor, “Tears Still Not Enough.” www.cbc.ca. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, February 10, 2015. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Ibid. ↵
- Solomon, “Tears are Not Enough,” 257. ↵
- Ibid., 262. ↵
- Solomon, “Tears are Not Enough,” 262. ↵