6 Korea, A Hot Start to the Cold War: St. Laurent and Pearson’s Ongoing Fight Against Communism
Ryland Gibb
Introduction
Louis St. Laurent became Prime Minister of Canada in 1948 and led an already successful Liberal Party to continued success. During and after his time as Prime Minister, he was praised for his decisiveness and for doing his duty to his country and leading Canada through uncertain times. When the previous Prime Minister, MacKenzie King, invited St. Laurent to be his Minister of Justice in 1942, he felt it was his duty to accept the offer and serve his country during the crisis of the Second World War. St. Laurent later became secretary of state for external affairs. when King relinquished the position in 1948. Soon St. Laurent became King’s choice of successor for Liberal Party leader, which he won in a vote, becoming Prime Minister in November 1948. By then, Canada had assumed a greater global presence and St. Laurent needed a capable leader at the position. He would appoint Lester B. Pearson to be the external affairs minister, a future Nobel Peace Prize winner and Prime Minister of Canada. With Pearson, St. Laurent would lead Canada through the beginnings of the Cold War against the Soviet Union and Communist expansion, most notably in the Korean War. The war would be a ‘hot’ start to the Cold War and it demonstrated the Western and democratic fight against the spread of Communism. The war and the politics surrounding the crisis of Korea would also demonstrate the leadership of St. Laurent and Pearson as they managed Canada’s role on a global stage.
The outbreak of war in Korea resulted, in large part, from the American and Soviet conflict both on the Korean peninsula and in the United Nations. Canada was one of the few western countries fancied by both the Soviet Union and the United States to be on the UN Temporary Committee on Korea which had been created to alleviate tensions in the region. St. Laurent, who was the Secretary for external affairs, and Pearson, as his under-secretary, saw the UN involvement as an opportunity for the budding global political power of Canada to show what it could do. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister at the time, was weary of the UN committee and what it might mean for Canada. He feared that the US would use Canada to push its own agenda and, in the worst case scenario, push the world back into war. St. Laurent and Pearson, on the other hand, were fierce opponents of Communism and worried greatly how it might be spread throughout the world. Fearing that if the UN let Korea fall completely into the Communist sphere of influence, other countries in the area and around the world would follow suit. This was the beginning of what was known as the domino effect, and it is also why St. Laurent, especially as prime minister, and Pearson, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, began taking more action in the UN against the hostile spread of Communism.
Cold War and Spread of Communism: St Laurent’s Principles
As minister of external affairs before he became prime minister, St Laurent outlined his vision for Canada in the world. In the Gray Lecture at the University of Toronto in January 1947, St. Laurent outlined five principles to guide Canada. These five principles, according to historian Hector MacKenzie, were “national unity, political liberty, rule of law in national and international affairs, the values of a Christian civilization, and the willingness to accept international responsibilities.”[1] Of these, two are directly related to international affairs and they show how St. Laurent believed Canada should play an international role. The “willingness to accept international responsibilities” is a hint that Canada would act in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations. In fact, one might argue that St Laurent’s Gray Lecture was the beginning of Canada’s policy on “peacekeeping”, whereby it would send troops to countries the UN declared as in need of help to keep the peace. This can be seen in conjunction with St. Laurent’s third principle, “rule of law in national and international affairs.” It established the principle of not intervening in the affairs of other countries without the undeniable truth of international laws or human rights being broken. MacKenzie further states that St. Laurent “neither repudiated nor reconsidered the policies of his predecessor.”[2] This would continue to be the trend adopted by other Canadian Prime Ministers who make only minor policy changes to those ideas during their tenure. St. Laurent set the standard for the future of Canadian external affairs with these five principles laid out in the Gray Lecture.
For a better look at Louis St. Laurent’s stance on Communism, one can look at his principle of “values of a Christian society”. This shows Canadians that the non-religious Communists would get no sympathy in St Laurent’s new Canadian foreign policy. This is especially so when, according to the western view, Communists often bent or broke international law and provided no political liberty for the people within their jurisdictions. This could be interpreted as St. Laurent’s plea to Canada to become united over the mutual threat of Communism and accept that Canada has a duty to protect not only itself, but other countries from the evils of the Communist threat. Adam Chapnick interprets those principles slightly differently. In his view St Laurent’s “Christian values” meant for Canada “the requirement to consider the values of humanity in the conduct of politics.”[3] If this is how St. Laurent intended it to be interpreted, it would still be aimed at the threat of Communism for its disregard of human rights and freedoms, especially in its conduct of politics. Adam Chapnick further claims “St-Laurent had set a new precedent by articulating a clear set of Canadian foreign policy principles and values.”[4] Pearson, when he was Under-secretary of State for External Affairs, repeated St. Laurent’s principles in a speech in Vancouver he titled “Some Principles of Canadian Foreign Policy.”[5] When Pearson gave this speech the tension between the democratic west and Communist east had increased, and while he did not emphasise Canadian national unity as St Laurent had, he instead suggested a guiding principle for Canada should be to provide “steady and consistent, but unprovocative resistance to Communist aggression or indeed to any aggression.”[6] The shift in tone from national unity to resistance to Communism was a sentiment that St. Laurent shared but it did not diminish St Laurent’s commitment to the other principles, he articulated in his Gray Lecture. However, both he and Pearson directed their attention to the growing threat of the spread of Communism and authoritarianism.
Pearson as External Affairs Minister
Almost immediately after the Second World War, a number of international concerns materialized for Canada as, together with the United States, France, and Britain, it turned its attention to rebuilding Europe and to the emerging tensions around the world. “Decolonization, insurrections, civil wars, the fear of Communism, and economic concerns”[7] were some of the major reasons why St. Laurent and Pearson believed Canada should become involved in international affairs. The two of them would have two years working closely under Prime Minister King, developing their plans and trusting each other; this pairing would turn out to be beneficial for Canada. They had similar ideals and thoughts on many subjects, allowing them to work well together, and had mutual trust that allowed them to work on items separately without micromanaging or intervention. Political scientists, Hilliker and Barry, show the similarities between the two. They claim “St. Laurent believed that enlightened public support was critical to the effective conduct of foreign policy.” Pearson did too, stating: “We were both convinced that our country should play its full part in the international organisation of peace and security.”[8] The relationship they would build and continue aided Canadian foreign affairs and allowed Pearson to gain experience that he would put to use in the future, becoming President of the United Nations General Assembly and winning a Nobel Peace prize for his role in the Suez Canal Crisis.[9]
When St Laurent became Prime Minister he allowed Pearson nearly free reign over Canadian foreign affairs with few exceptions, although they continued to work together closely. “St Laurent had no reason to fear that he might have to take responsibility for actions he disagreed with, and the minister could be confident of support in cabinet for his actions.” Although Pearson was well trusted in foreign affairs, St. Laurent did not hesitate to step in when he felt he needed to.[10] The foreign affairs ministry was always working to promote Canadian values even when those values also reflected Canada’s self-interests such as securing new trade deals, developing collective security arrangements and engaging in peacekeeping operations around the world.[11] It was an approach that became known as dualism, which Ernest LeVost describes as “acknowledging the Canadian ideology, with its emphasis on democracy defined as anti-Communism, [while working] in tandem with Canada’s self-interests.”[12]
Outbreak of the Korean War
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the USSR and the USA needed to clear the Japanese occupied territories of remaining troops. The Korean Peninsula was one of them, with the USSR starting from the north and the USA from the south. The two nations agreed to meet at the 38th parallel. The result was that Korea was split in two sections, with pro-Communist sympathizers in the north (with influence from China and the USSR) and pro-capitalism democratic factions in the south (with influence from the USA and other western allies). From the Soviet Union’s perspective, Korea was a ‘springboard’ that the west could use to launch an attack on the Communist nations and it thus wanted the peninsula to be Communist and loyal to the USSR. It would act as a buffer state between the western nations and the Russian motherland, just as Poland and East Germany were in Europe. From the western perspective, Korea must have its own ‘unimpeded’ and free elections as a necessary condition to full independence. ‘Unimpeded’ to the west meant that Korea would be supervised by the United Nations, a western dominated council at the time. To the United States and its allies, including Canada, if Korea were to be ruled by the Communists, it would mean that other smaller countries might fall to the threat of Communism as well, with several of these smaller countries being too close to the United States for its liking. There were other frustrations experienced by western powers with the Soviet Union, “in particular, the intransigence of the Soviets to cooperate with the UN Temporary Commission on Korea, which included Canada as a member state, to hold free elections.”[13] The USSR, however, insisted that all nations leave Korea to itself and let it not be interfered with by outside forces. This, of course, for St. Laurent and others merely would hide the Soviet Union’s true intentions of wanting Korea to become Communist controlled, as they prepared the North Korean military with Soviet military personnel and Chinese backing. North Korea and its sponsors anticipated an easy victory over South Korea, provided that the United States would not rapidly intervene with its forces.[14] North Korea felt that it could rapidly win the war against the south had the peninsula been left to just its inhabitants. That may have been the case, but in an area where the fear of Communist expansion and outright aggression within the region was acute, the western led United Nations authorised support of South Korea in its defence against an authoritarian Communist regime in North Korea.
UN Declaration and USA
The outbreak of the war tested the United Nations for the first time in its then five year history. It needed any and all interventions in conflict around the world to be legal and “within the terms of the Charter” if it were to remain a trusted entity and continue on, as it does today. If the Americans were to act without UN approval, it could start a worldwide struggle between Communist and non-Communist nations. In the emergency meeting held on the 25th of June, the day North Korea began its invasion, the UN decreed that a breach of peace had been conducted and that action needed to be taken, it voted 9-0 in favour of the action. Unfortunately for the UN, the permanent force that it has envisioned had not yet come to fruition. “In consequence, if any steps were to be taken to deal with the crisis, they would have to be taken by individual council members “acting within the terms of the Charter, but on their own initiative.”[15] Yugoslavia abstained and the USSR was not present for the vote, as it was boycotting the UN over the exclusion of the People’s Republic of China, in favour of the Republic of China (which had lost the civil war and was now confined to the Island of Taiwan). This was almost a relief to the Security Council as the USSR could have vetoed the declaration and forced the issue into further debate, giving the North Koreans more time to continue their assault against the South Korean Army. If the 25 June decree was not enough for the legality of UN member intervention, than the decree on 27 June went further, stating “that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area concerned.”[16] Those words were repeated by Pearson in an address to the UN on 28 June , defending the United States for actions taken in preparation to help the South Korean defence.
The controversy stems from the wording of the 25 June resolution, as it entails that any member forces of the UN were to go to Korea to ‘observe’ the North Korean forces back to the 38th parallel. This would then make the American action of sending forces to help fight back the South against the North Korean forces illegal and outside of the UN resolution, as the 27 June resolution would not be approved until eleven hours after the American action. This could make the UN look as if it was just following the actions of the United States, which contravened the purpose of the UN. The debates, especially in French-language newspapers in Canada, used this as the reason Canada would be supporting the war, to follow in the footsteps of Uncle Sam. Soon though, most of the Canadian MP’s were on the side of support for the South Koreans, with only a few disagreeing. Many of those were from around areas in Quebec, which historically were opposed to Canada’s involvement in overseas intervention.
Canada’s Reaction and Involvement
As the US made headway in securing forces to be put into immediate action in Korea by 27 June, “Policy-makers in Canada, meanwhile, confined their efforts… to a continuing assessment of the developing conflict. The politicians among them contributed to the cause by delivering stout declarations of piety and goodwill.”[17] Although Canada did not have a huge permanent military force to take immediate action, debates in the House of Commons continued to be focused on Canadian issues, not issues of building a force for dispatch to Korea. It was not until 30 June that debate on the Korean issue and Canada’s involvement would be discussed. This discussion, starting late in the session, would be brought up by an anti-war MP, arguing that Canada should not follow the US into the conflict. That member was the only one who spoke against Canadian involvement. St. Laurent would reassure the House that “Canada would not be participating in war against any state. It would [only] be part of collective police action under the control and authority of the United Nations for the purpose of restoring peace to an area where an aggression has occurred.”[18] This was met with applause and agreement and would have implications that would ripple within Canada for decades to come. Canada was not going to war on the side of US aggression against Communism; it was helping the United Nations to enforce a Security Council resolution to enforce international law and secure peace.
The initial Canadian contributions to the Korean War first came from the Navy and Airforce, offering three destroyers and an air transport squadron. Canada informed the United Nations these destroyers were headed to the Pacific on 12 July – the U.S. had already been informally informed – with the intent to have these destroyers join the United Nations forces,[19] the first of what would be a total of eight Canadian warships to serve in the waters off Korea during the course of the conflict. Their duties included blockading the coast, preventing enemy amphibious landings, protecting the UN fleet, bombarding onshore targets and offering humanitarian aid to isolated Korean fishing villages.[20] This was aligned with St. Laurent’s plan of Canada being a nation joining the UN in Korea to secure peace and enforce law, while keeping its servicemen out of immediate harm’s way for the time being. Canada would not get through the conflict without having troops be on the front lines, however, although they tried when it looked like the war was lost, and when the war looked to be won. Sarah Colbourn brings the Canadian public’s feelings further into light when she quotes a message sent to Pearson from Leolyn Dana Wilgress, the High Commissioner for Canada in London, England on July 18th 1950:
A rather smug, but entirely natural feeling, that it is the turn of the United States to bear the first brunt. Canada went to war in 1939, twenty-six months earlier than the United States, and there is a strong feeling that there is some justice in the present turn of the wheel of fortune.[21]
This feeling in Canada would show in their hesitance to send ground troops to Korea, especially with the initial advances made by the North Koreans. Canada would send air and naval forces to the peninsula in July 1950, but Canadian ground troops would not set foot on Korean soil until the following December and would not see the front lines until February 1951. The tardiness of the Canadians during the start of the war meant that they would miss the major front line challenges that defined the first months of the war.
St. Laurent and Pearson did not take the sending of troops and equipment to Korea lightly but knew how they needed to act to support South Korean independence and to secure the UN’s place on the world stage as it was still living in the tainted legacy of the League of Nations. When the Korean War broke out, the strength of the army’s active force stood at 20,369 in all ranks.[22] Many of these ranks were administrative, as Canada had undergone a rapid dismantling of its military immediately post-war to allocate money for social programs that Mackenzie King would implement. The military could send a brigade of around 800 men to Korea but officials feared that the brigade would not be enough to maintain Canada’s commitment as a separate, independent force and would be quickly swallowed by the Americans. The fully trained professional army was also needed post-war to defend Canadian territory, and sending them across the globe could put Canada’s security in jeopardy. For these reasons, Canada decided on 7 August to raise a ‘Special Military Force’ to be sent to Korea, leaving the full time forces in Canada for home defence.
This ‘Special Military Force’ would be raised completely by volunteers and to get it done expeditiously, much of the screening process for recruits was by-passed. This meant that as quickly as men were recruited and began training, they were being uncommissioned if ailments became apparent, slowing the already slow training of troops. All of the requirements of training new replacements were amplified as the war went on into September. Now the Americans and the South Koreans were barely holding the line along the Naktong, and Canada was under pressure to make up for its limited contributions. This resulted in a partially trained Canadian Battalion being made ready to sail from the Seattle docks for Korea by the third week in November 1950.[23] Once in Korea, Canada’s Special Military Force was in disarray, caught between using the outdated British equipment and weapons they had trained with, and the superior and updated American weapons and equipment. Some of the heavy weapons they thought they would use would be discarded once they got to Korea, in favour of the more mobile American heavy weapons.
When the North Korean and Chinese counter attack was observed, Canada approved a larger portion of troops to be dispatched to Korea. This force was approved on 21 February 1951.[24] The Canadians would help push the enemy back to the 38th parallel and the war became a stalemate. Canadian defensive positions during the stagnant war would hold and be recognized internationally. The North Korean advance had stalled near the 38th parallel, similar to the line agreed upon by the US and USSR at the end of the Second World War. In the end, 516 Canadians would be lost in the Korean conflict.
Korean War Truce and Canadian Peacekeeping
The Korean War has not officially ended as a peace treaty has never been signed, although the fighting ended on 27 July 1953, when military commanders from the United States, representing the United Nations Command, the Korean People’s Army, and Chinese People’s Volunteer Army signed the Korean Armistice Agreement, ending the three years of fighting of the 1950-1953 Korean War.[25] In the Armistice Agreement, a four kilometre wide demilitarised zone would separate the two nations from coast to coast. In Korea and afterwards, Canada’s soldiers abroad were almost always professional and always sent wherever their government believed that they were needed to shore up the outer defences of Western democracy, usually with little fanfare at home.[26] St Laurent’s principles had paved the way for Canada’s commitment and the Korean War had put them to the test, but both he and Pearson would not waver. Their principles held true in Korea and showed to the world that Canada was a force that would legally enforce international law, but only within rules set by the UN. This would be put to the test a number of times after 1950, the most recent incident occurring in Iraq in 2003.
Conclusion
Canada’s involvement in Korea was substantial, both politically and militarily. The process which led Canada there was slow and tedious as legal connotations, public opinion, and time and financial constraints made logistics difficult. St. Laurent and Pearson shared a similar commitment that helped push Canada onto the global stage, particularly through the United Nation involvement and resolution. The trust St. Laurent had in Pearson to handle foreign affairs at the UN was unmatched and it paid off, as St. Laurent could focus on domestic or other pressing matters, knowing that his international policies would be fulfilled by Pearson. Although Canada was late in sending a substantial force to Korea, once there the troops handled the logistics of weapons and commanders well, making a name for themselves in the conflict. This test of St. Laurent and Pearson’s role on a global scale made Canada better and when other crises would arise later in the decade, Canada would be there to help keep the peace and prevent conflict. The decade that followed in Canadian history would chart Canada’s foreign policy for decades to come, particularly its commitment to peacekeeping forces, if they were sanctioned by the UN, and adopted a hard line to counter the threat of Communism.
- Hector Mackenzie, Shades of Gray? The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs (2007) ↵
- Mackenzie, Shades of Gray? The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs (2007) ↵
- Patrice A. Dutil and Adam Chapnick, “St-Laurent’s Gray Lecture and Canadian Citizenship in History,” in The Unexpected Louis St-Laurent: Politics and Policies for a Modern Canada (UBC Press, 2020), . 467-479. ↵
- . Dutil and Chapnick, “St-Laurent’s Gray Lecture and Canadian Citizenship in History. 467-479. ↵
- Dutil and Chapnick, “ St-Laurent’s Gray Lecture and Canadian Citizenship in History,” in The Unexpected Louis St-Laurent: Politics and Policies for a Modern Canada (UBC Press, 2020), pp. 467-479. ↵
- Patrice A. Dutil and Adam Chapnick, “Chapter 21 St-Laurent’s Gray Lecture and Canadian Citizenship in History,” in The Unexpected Louis St-Laurent: Politics and Policies for a Modern Canada (UBC Press, 2020), pp. 467-479. ↵
- [7] Ernest A. LeVos (National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1991), pp. 1-325. ↵
- Hilliker, John, and Donald Barry. “The PM and the SSEA in Canada’s Foreign Policy: Sharing the Territory, 1946-1968.” International Journal 50, no. 1 (1994): 163–88. ↵
- Hilliker, John, and Donald Barry. “The PM and the SSEA in Canada’s Foreign Policy: Sharing the Territory, 1946-1968.” International Journal 50, no. 1 (1994): 163–88. ↵
- Hilliker, John, and Donald Barry. “The PM and the SSEA in Canada’s Foreign Policy: Sharing the Territory, 1946-1968.” International Journal 50, no. 1 (1994): 163–88. ↵
- Ernest A. LeVos (National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1991), pp. 1-325. ↵
- Ernest A. LeVos (National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1991), pp. 1-325. ↵
- Colbourn, Sarah. “Canada Declassified. Canadian Perspectives on the Conflict in Korea.” University of Toronto. Accessed March 14, 2023 ↵
- Ohn Chang-Il, “The Causes of the Korean War, 1950-1953 ,” International Journal of Korean Studies Vol. XIV, no. No. 2 (2010), https://doi.org/https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ijoks/v14i2/f_0019548_16694.pdf. ↵
- Margaret Doxey, “Denis Stairs, the Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974, Pp. XV, 373,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (1975): pp. 152-153, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900045339. ↵
- Margaret Doxey, “Denis Stairs, the Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974, Pp. XV, 373,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (1975): pp. 152-153, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900045339. ↵
- Margaret Doxey, “Denis Stairs, the Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974, Pp. XV, 373,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (1975): pp. 152-153, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900045339. ↵
- Margaret Doxey, “Denis Stairs, the Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974, Pp. XV, 373,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (1975): pp. 152-153, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900045339. ↵
- Colbourn, Sarah. “Canada Declassified. Canadian Perspectives on the Conflict in Korea.” University of Toronto. Accessed March 14, 2023 ↵
- Canada. Department of National Defence. Directorate of History Heritage. “Canada and the Korean War”. Montreal, Quebec: Art Global, 2002. ↵
- Colbourn, Sarah. “Canada Declassified. Canadian Perspectives on the Conflict in Korea.” University of Toronto. Accessed March 14, 2023 ↵
- David Jay Bercuson, Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War (Toronto, Ontrario: University of Toronto Press, 2002). ↵
- David Jay Bercuson, Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War (Toronto, Ontrario: University of Toronto Press, 2002). ↵
- David Jay Bercuson, Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War (Toronto, Ontrario: University of Toronto Press, 2002). ↵
- United Nations Command, “Armistice Negotiations ,” United Nations Command > History > 1951-1953: Armistice Negotiations, accessed April 1, 2023, https://www.unc.mil/History/1951-1953-Armistice-Negotiations/#:~:text=On July 27, 1953, military,the 1950-1953 Korean War. ↵
- David Jay Bercuson, Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War (Toronto, Ontrario: University of Toronto Press, 2002). ↵