12 Saying “No” to the United States: How Prime Minister Jean Chrétien Kept Canadian Soldiers out of the Iraq War

Introduction

For many political leaders, committing troops to a combat zone is one of the most difficult decisions they have to make. Among the many ramifications of such decisions is the knowledge that some of these soldiers will not come home alive. For Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Canada’s twentieth prime minister, soldiers coming home in body bags was one of many factors to weigh on his decision of whether to commit troops to an invasion of Iraq in 2003. Following the attack on the United States on 11 September 2001, US President, George W. Bush, declared war on terrorism and sought retribution for those who died. President Bush had asked for — and received — support from numerous nations, including Canada, when United States dispatched troops to Afghanistan looking for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in October, 2001. As the American war on terrorism escalated, Bush sought support from the United Nations to invade Iraq under the premise that it was hiding weapons of mass destruction. While Great Britain and Australia supported the US, other nations, including Canada, demanded additional proof of the US claims that Iraq leader, Saddam Hussein, was, indeed, harbouring weapons of mass destruction. Canada and other nations sought a binding resolution from the United Nations for a campaign against Iraq. The request bought time for Jean Chrétien, as he gauged the resolve of his Cabinet, weighed the potential fall-out from the opposition parties in Parliament, and determined how the Canadian public might react to Canada joining the military campaign against Iraq. Chrétien knew his decision would have ramifications on Canada’s foreign policy, especially its relationship with the United States, its closest neighbor and most important trading partner. With Great Britain already pledging its support for the American invasion, Canada would be in a unique position if they refused to join the coalition. While Canada had earlier refused to join British and American military operations, notably with the British in Egypt in 1956 and the Americans in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, staying out of Iraq would mark the first time Canada said no to both long-term Allies as they engaged in a military incursion at the same time. This essay examines the internal and external pressures on Jean Chrétien as he decided on Canada’s participation in the Iraq War, how he communicated his ultimate decision to the Canadian public, and the ramifications for Canada of not joining their closest ally.

Although the Canada-United States relationship has been long described as special and unique, that relationship has also had its share of challenges over the past two hundred years. Presidents, prime ministers, and political parties have adopted different positions on a variety of issues important to the two countries over many decades. They have often developed different foreign policy positions on numerous issues, but, invariably, economic, and geographic proximity has ensured they never stray too far from each other on most issues. The symmetry between the two nations has often been reflected in the public relationship between the President and the Prime Minister. Following the inauguration of Republican George W. Bush in 2000, many believed it would be one of those times when relations would be strained with Canada, as the two leaders were philosophically different and the ideological difference between the two governments seemed to growing.^[1] According to author and political commentator, Michael Adams, the slow divergence between the two countries had been gathering momentum since the end of the Cold War. While Canadians questioned authority and became more socially liberal, Americans drifted in the opposite direction, towards social conservatism, especially when it came to foreign affairs.^[2] With a Republican president in the White House and a Liberal Prime Minister in 24 Sussex Drive, there was, indeed, a possibility — even a high probability — the two leaders would not agree on certain issues.

Following the September 11 attacks by al-Qaeda terrorists, President Bush announced that America would wage “war on terrorism.” Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Bush made an unequivocal statement, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” It was a clear message to every other nation in the world.^[3] For Bush, there was no middle ground, but it presented a serious conundrum for Prime Minister Chrétien, as he had to define what any support for the US would look like. As early as 2002, President Bush began to signal to the international community his preference for a ground assault in Iraq. Canada, under Chretien’s leadership, had joined the United States and NATO forces on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan earlier, in October, 2001, demonstrating, too, that it was committed to fighting terrorists around the world. However, Canada and other members of the United Nations looked at a potential war in Iraq differently. While Chrétien received up-to-date intelligence reports from the United States, he also leaned on his own diplomats and Canadian intelligence to help him formulate Canada’s policy and use that information to devise his own plan moving forward. Chrétien had to weigh the accuracy of the American claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, one of President Bush’s main arguments for mounting an Iraq invasion.^[4] Chrétien and Canada’s intelligence community were wary of such claims from the Americans, and focused on the ongoing United Nations investigations into whether or not Iraq did, indeed, possess weapons of mass destruction. Canada made it clear that their support would hinge upon a United Nation resolution to invade Iraq.

Wary of American and British motivations for invading Iraq, Chrétien weighed his options carefully and refused to be rushed into a decision by either the Americans or the British. While awaiting the results from a United Nation team of weapons’ investigators, Chrétien was looking — and hoping — for a diplomatic solution for Iraq rather than an invasion. The lead UN investigator, Hans Blix, had stated in January 2003 that he did not expect to find a “smoking gun” to support the American claim that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.^[5] The United Nations, nevertheless, continued to assess the situation and investigate American claims, but it was becoming clear, at the same time, that President Bush intended to invade Iraq with, or without, a UN mandate. This left other UN members, including Canada, with a difficult decision. Chrétien, meanwhile, was considering advice from within the bureaucracy as well as listening to criticism from those who opposed a military intervention in Iraq. When asked on 23 January about the pressure he was receiving from the Americans to make a decision, Chrétien responded, “If I have to say no, I will. If I have to say yes, I will. We are an independent country.”^[6] In the days leading to the US invasion, Chrétien continued to use the United Nations as a shield to push for additional time to achieve a peaceful and diplomatic solution. It was becoming apparent, however, that the Americans had already made up their mind to invade, and a diplomatic solution was unlikely. For Chrétien, time was running out, and he would soon have to make a decision.

While the Canadians continued to ruminate about joining the Iraq invasion, the United Kingdom rendered its decision. By April 2002, British Prime Minister Tony Blair had pledged his support to George Bush and the United States. Blair agreed with his American counterpart that it was time for a regime change in Iraq: “I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go.”^[7] Then, Blair joined President Bush in trying to persuade Chrétien on the importance of the invasion. In the fall of 2002, Chrétien informed Blair at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg he was not interested in “getting into the business of replacing leaders we don’t like without being covered under the flag of the UN.”^[8] While intelligence gathering continued, Chrétien realized his decision would center on two main items. First, was it, indeed, time for a regime change in Iraq, and second, did the country possess weapons of mass destruction even though United Nations investigators had not found any evidence to support that claim?

The attitude of the Canadian public mattered a great deal to Chrétien, and a potential invasion of Iraq never seemed to resonate with Canadians. As early as November 2002, large anti-war demonstrations occurred across the country. In one such demonstration, 2,000 people gathered in Queen’s Park in Toronto.^[9] They were joined the following day by demonstrations in other Canadian cities, notably Edmonton, Winnipeg, Vancouver and Halifax. By March 2003, both the size of crowds and the number of locations grew as Canadians across the country voiced their opposition to Canada joining the coalition against Iraq. Not surprisingly, the largest protest took place in Quebec, where there was a long history of opposition to Canada’s participation in overseas engagement. In Montreal, more than 200,000 people gathered in near frigid conditions to send a message to Chrétien and American President George Bush to stay out of Iraq.^[10] While over sixty percent of Canadians told pollsters they were opposed to the war, that number increased to 77 percent when looking at Quebec.^[11] Opposition to Canadian military incursions abroad from Quebec citizens have been strong, dating to the First World War and earlier. The 1918 Easter Riots in Quebec City left 150 casualties, when people protested the Military Services Act, which forced conscription upon certain Canadian citizens by the federal government.^[12] While the opinion of Quebec may not have been a central consideration for Chrétien, it likely factored into Liberal discussion and debate. In a referendum held in October, 1995, only 50.6 percent of Quebecers voted to remain part of Canada.^[13] Less than a decade later, the separatist movement remained strong, and Quebec was about to enter a provincial election. Staying out of the war could temper separatist rhetoric and potentially benefit the provincial Liberals in that election and relegate the Parti Québécois to the opposition benches. With citizens marching through Canadian streets, it seemed to confirm popular support for Prime Minister Chrétien’s leanings to stay out of Iraq unless there was a UN Resolution. By the time Prime Minister Chrétien officially announced Canadian soldiers would not take part in a ground invasion of Iraq, 66 percent of citizens approved of how he handled the situation.^[14] Although two-thirds of Canadians sided with Chrétien, one-third believed Canada needed to support the United States. Many of the dissenting voices against Chrétien came from the business community worried his decision would negatively impact trade with the Americans.^[15] These fears were not unfounded, as the potential fall-out of upsetting American trade relations could be substantial.

If Chrétien was looking for support, however, he found it amongst his Liberal party colleagues. There was thunderous applause from them in the House of Commons when he stated, “If military action proceeds without a new resolution in the Security Council, Canada will not participate.”^[16] A number of Liberal MP’s had earlier publicly voiced their objection to the invasion of Iraq and the aggressive action taken by the United States and Great Britain. Leading up to Chrétien’s announcement on 17 March 2003, several Liberal MPs made inflammatory remarks. In one instance, Carolyn Parrish, Liberal MP for Mississauga—Erindale, blurted out “Damn Americans. Hate those bastards,” after leaving a Liberal party meeting in February 2003.^[17] The anti-American and anti-Bush comments from Liberal MPs seemed contagious as a number of MPs and party members made similar comments that had the potential to undermine Chretien’s principled stance on the invasion. Minister of Natural Resources Herb Dhaliwal accused President Bush of “not being [a] statesman.”^[18] Chrétien demanded his colleagues cease with such insults: “It was the Americans’ privilege and right to make the decision they made,” he countered.^[19] While Chrétien brought his members into line, several within the Liberal caucus continued to harbor doubt on whether the right decision had been made. Liberal MP and President of the Treasury Board, Lucienne Robillard, asked candidly during a Cabinet meeting, “What if [the Americans] find WMD?”^[20] However, by that time, Chrétien had only one Liberal MP who withheld his support. David Pratt, Member of Parliament for Nepean—Carleton, found fault in relying on support from the United Nations, calling Chrétien’s decision an “abdication of national responsibility.”^[21]

While Prime Minister Chrétien had to deal with his own party members and cautioned them to tone down their anti-war and anti-American rhetoric, he was careful on how he positioned himself and the country with the United States. While publicly stating his respect for the American decision to commit troops to an Iraq ground war, Chrétien would later give insight into his thoughts at the time: “It [invasion] would be justified if there were an authorization from the Security Council. We would have said yes if that was the case. But when we said no, it was because the case was not made.”^[22] On 17 March 2003, Jean Chrétien stood in the House of Commons and announced that Canadians would not be involved in the pending invasion of Iraq. He spoke to Parliament before informing either the United States or British government.^[23] With the decision made, the ramifications and reaction from the Canadian public, Chretien’s Liberal colleagues, his political opponents, the media, and the international community were about to begin.

While Liberals in the House of Commons showered Chrétien with applause, the cheers, not surprisingly, were not shared across the aisle with the Opposition conservatives. The Bloc Quebecois and New Democratic Party, however, were supportive as both opposed war. Canadian Alliance leader, Stephen Harper, was careful not to specifically advocate support for an invasion of Iraq but condemned Chrétien for not supporting Canada’s neighbor, ally, and its largest economic trade partner. In responding to a question about the implications on Canada’s relationship with the United States, Harper quipped, “I don’t know what the ramifications are, but I know they won’t be good.”^[24] When the House of Commons’ motion to stay out of the Iraq War came to a vote, members of the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives were overwhelmingly opposed, with only one of their members supporting it. As American and British troops began their assault on Iraq, the opposition rhetoric intensified, especially from Stephen Harper, who said, “Whatever side you are on, this government is embarrassing. The Prime Minister’s behaviour is gutless …We have historically as a country stood beside our best friends and allies, the United States and Britain whenever they have been together. That is where we should be now.”^[25]

It may be difficult to align and reconcile a specific decision, such as refusing to join the invasion in Iraq in 2003, to Canada’s overall foreign policy initiatives, but it is important nonetheless to consider the decision from that perspective more broadly. When Chrétien was first elected as an MP in the riding of Saint-Maurice Laflèche in 1963, it was under the Liberal leadership of Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson. As a Pearson disciple, Chrétien shared Pearson’s notions of multilateralism and liberal internationalism, and looked to apply that philosophy to his own foreign policy decisions. By the mid-1990’s, moreover, the Liberal government had committed Canada to a values-based foreign policy, promoting such Canadian values [as] democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the environment.”^[26] It was difficult to espouse those values and then not oppose the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein, but Chrétien believed that those values should be promoted within UN action. In an interview many years later, Jean Chrétien described the pressure being exerted upon him by Tony Blair to participate in the removal of Saddam Hussein, whom he [Blair] labelled a terrible dictator, “I said. Of course, Tony, he’s a terrible dictator. But if we’re in the business of replacing all the dictators we don’t like, who’s next?”^[27] Chretien’s response clearly shows the precarious balance between calling for democratic rule in other countries and inserting it into his foreign policy objectives with the full knowledge he will not always be willing to join with other nations to impose or enforce Canada’s values on rogue nations. Nonetheless, Chretien and the Liberal party continued their rhetoric that “Canada’s foreign policy should promote core Canadian values,” even as talk of a potential Iraq invasion gained momentum throughout 2002.^[28] Such rhetoric led critics to accuse Chrétien and the Liberal Party of making disingenuous and contradictory foreign policy statements. Political scientist Denis Stair went one step further, suggesting that, “Canadians, in their approach to international affairs, have grown alarmingly smug, complacent, and self-deluded.” They speak of values but do little to enforce them.^[29]

Chrétien’s detractors were worried that his decision to refuse participation in the Iraq War would have a detrimental impact on the Canadian economy as noted above. With Canada depending so heavily on trade with the United States, the business community was fearful of potential sanctions from the Americans. With an estimated 87 percent of Canadian trade dependent on the American market, any disruptions would have disastrous consequences.^[30] Fears about whether US governmental policy would be re-adjusted to punish Canada were heightened, especially when the US Ambassador to Canada, Paul Celluci, stated a week into the Iraq War that Americans, “are so disappointed and upset that Canada is not fully supporting us.”^[31] The fear of the Canadian business community was further heightened when US National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, cautioned in May that Canada’s decision to stay out of the war would not be forgotten.^[32] Such warnings caused justified anxieties among Canadians. In reality however, the trade between the two countries was so intertwined that no significant damage or fallout was felt in the months and years following Canada’s decision. Prime Minister Chrétien downplayed the potential economic fallout himself when discussing the consequences on trade relations, “We have disagreed in the past. We will disagree in the future. But in terms of our trade relations – we represent 25% of their market, and they represent 87% of our market. So we are a community of interests, and what we are selling to them, most of it, they buy because they need it, not because they want to be nice.”^[33]

While isolated incidents of cancelled contracts and petty economic harassment did occur, the larger concerns and fears from Canadian businesses did not materialize, neither during the conflict nor in the immediate aftermath. However, that was not the end of the concern from the business community. Like most conflicts, the invasion of Iraq resulted in massive destruction not only in human costs but also in infrastructure and materials. The reconstruction of Iraq had the potential to result in very large and lucrative contracts for the business community. As the war in Iraq moved swiftly, talks of reconstruction began just weeks after the invasion and the focus for Canadians turned to whether they would be able to bid on what could amount to be massive expenditures on rebuilding Iraq. There was fear that Prime Minister Chrétien’s decision to stay out of the war would prevent Canadian firms from bidding on US contracts for work in Iraq. This sense of fear was heightened when United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, discussed the possibility of excluding those countries that voted against the United Nations Security Council resolution against invading Iraq from bidding on reconstruction projects: “Let’s be candid,” he said. “It was a coalition of the willing…that took on this task in the face of direct political opposition from a number of nations around the world, and quite frankly, from Canada.”^[34] Such comments were disturbing and unwelcome not only from the Canadian business community, but also from the Canadian government that was looking to participate in what was deemed, by some, to be a lucrative reconstruction process. The Liberals were quick to point out that humanitarian needs were driving their push to be part of Iraq reconstruction when they sent a delegation to a UN conference on Iraq reconstruction in June 2003.^[35]

In the fall of 2003, the US government announced only “coalition nations” would be allowed to bid on what they called ‘primary’ contracts. These reconstruction projects were funded by the American government and worth an estimated $18 billion. While it was unlikely any Canadian companies were large enough to bid on such contracts, the exclusion angered large business leaders as well as the Liberal government. Jean Chrétien had already announced his resignation by this time and was to leave office on 13 December 2003. His successor, Paul Martin called the decision “difficult to fathom” and wanted the US government to reconsider as the Canadian taxpayers were financially helping with the reconstruction projects in Iraq.^[36] Prime Minister Martin hoped for a better relationship with President Bush than Chrétien had with President Bush. A month after taking office, President Bush confirmed to Paul Martin that Canadian companies would be allowed to bid on the next wave of Iraq reconstruction projects, estimated at approximately $6 billion. Shortly after this announcement, Prime Minister Martin announced that Canada would forgive the Iraq debt of $750 million.^[37] While the fear of economic reprisals from the United States were valid leading up to and during the early months of the invasion, most experts agree the impact of Canada’s decision to not join the war was minimal to business and industry.^[38]

Even if the Canadian business community did not suffer any severe economic impact from Chrétien’s decision to keep Canada out of the Iraq War, what impact did it have on the relationship between he and President Bush? After Chrétien made his decision, many, including Chrétien, felt it was time for fence-mending between the two nations. Throughout the lead-up to his decision, the Prime Minister had always been careful not to publicly admonish those who felt overthrowing Saddam Hussein was necessary. Nor did he criticize Bush’s war on terror. In fact, Chrétien increased the size of the Canadian forces in Afghanistan, which took some of the financial and military strain off the United States and its allies fighting in Iraq. He was also quick to offer financial and humanitarian aid to help repair the damage in Iraq. It appeared, however, that President Bush was not as quick to forgive and forget. Bush cancelled his planned official visit to Ottawa on 5 May 2003, pointing to the pressure of dealing with the ongoing war. However, at the same time, Bush invited Australian Prime Minister John Howard to his ranch in Texas. Howard and the Australians were active participants in the Iraq war, and many felt this was a deliberate attempt by the Americans to show favour to those who supported him and shun those who did not. The American Ambassador to Canada, Paul Celluci, removed any ambiguity about Bush’s intentions shortly after the event, when he bluntly stated the President would have made the trip to Ottawa if Canada had participated in the war.^[39]

Even though Canadian Armed Forces were not part of the Iraq invasion, Canada’s significant deployment of soldiers within the region, in some ways aided the US invasion of Iraq. That Canada followed such a policy prompted some critics to accuse Chrétien of playing a shell game with Canadian and United Nation forces. One political commentator noted that “the plan is to mask [Canada’s] military’s Iraq pacifism with Afghanistan activism and hope President Bush is somehow appeased.”^[40] Another common criticism was that if Canada were able to send enough soldiers into Afghanistan, they would not have sufficient military personnel to help if the Americans and British came calling. In Parliament, the opposition parties accused Chrétien of playing political games with Canada’s Armed Forces. Bloc Quebecois leader Gilles Duceppe was concerned military personnel would be used in Iraq and grilled the Prime Minister for clarification. Chrétien was quick to clarify that no soldiers would be used in Iraq and justified Canada’s presence in Afghanistan: “Mr. Speaker, we still have many soldiers in Afghanistan, and we will have thousands there this summer. It is our duty to maintain our presence in the gulf to protect them and to provide them with the materiel they need to carry out their job, to keep the peace in Afghanistan and to try to help rebuild the country.”^[41]

Hurt feelings, petty grievances, and differing opinions aside, the relationship between Canada and the United States was too important to let deteriorate too far. Canada was committed to helping rebuild Iraq and, at the same time, to rebuild their relations with the United States. It was hoped the reconstruction project and the $300 million the Canadian government committed to the effort would be appreciated by their southern neighbour. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had made no secret of his displeasure with the Canadian government over its Iraq decision, seemed to signal a thawing in the relationship and a path to move forward, when he said “We will get over whatever disappointments that existed in recent weeks.”^[42] In Iraq, no weapons of mass destruction were found, and by fall of 2003, the United Nations passed a new Security Council resolution asking members to supply troops and financial considerations to help reconstruct Iraq. The occupying forces would be led by the United States military, and it was hoped in Canada that having the countries working together again would also help to heal any rift that had developed between the two nations during the crisis over the Iraq War.

Conclusion

In retrospect, Prime Minister Chrétien’s decision to keep Canadian soldiers out of the war would appear to be one of his best decisions as leader. Nearly twenty years later it is difficult to quantify the positive aspects of the US led invasion in Iraq. There were no weapons of mass destruction and while Saddam Hussein was removed as leader, the region remains unsettled. While Canadians favoured staying out of the Iraq War, Chrétien has also received praise from around the world that considered his decision to be made, “with courage and some dignity.”^[43] From the beginning, Chrétien had taken what he insisted was a principled view on the war and one that reflected a long practice in Canadian foreign policy. Chrétien asserted that Canada would participate only if war was sanctioned by the United Nations. Chrétien did not wish to betray Canada’s longstanding commitment to liberal internationalism and that position had support from his own party. His critics, chief among them the opposition Canadian Alliance party and some members of the business community, were hard-pressed to find fault in keeping Canadian soldiers out of harm’s way. Instead, they focused on the potential consequence in Canada’s relationship with the United States of not siding with their American and British allies and friends. Even now it is difficult to find quantitative data that would suggest Canadian businesses or Canada’s foreign trade was negatively impacted by Chrétien’s decision. Relations between the two countries have continued pretty much as they were before the war, with the usual ups and downs, as political leaders come and go. Speaking on the subject in 2011, Chrétien stood by the decision that he made in 2003. While acknowledging the strain in his relationship with President Bush, Chrétien stated, it was actually Tony Blair who pushed him most aggressively and broached the subject of removing Saddam Hussein from power. “I had more discussions about the possibility of going to war with Tony Blair than with George Bush,” Chrétien recalled. “I always had a suspicion that Tony said to George, ‘I will take care of Jean.”^[44] Whether it was a personality conflict between Chrétien and Bush or an inside glimpse into the ever-changing world of foreign policy, this candid statement gives us a sense of the strained relationship between the two leaders. Input from other world leaders, the question of aligning with the foreign policy of other nations, following the United Nations, feedback from the public, and pressures from the political world – both within the Liberal party and opposition parties — all factored into Chretien’s decision. With all of those factors, as well as numerous insights from military, foreign affairs, political and personal advisors, the decision ultimately rest with the prime minster. Jean Chrétien weighed every piece of information he received and decided in the crisis, “I have said clearly our position [on war against Iraq] is that it is not justified.”^[45] Chrétien has never wavered from that statement, not even twenty years later.